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ABSTRACT
Sarah Webster Bidgood
“Don’t Gossip!”: Exploring the Intersection of Past and Present in Post-Soviet, Diasporic 
Identities
(Under the direction of Dr. Jacqueline M. Olich)
 In this master’s thesis, I examine the identity of two Russian-speaking, diasporic 
groups: the first, an elderly community of Soviet immigrants living in Brooklyn; the second, 
an online community of Russian-speakers from all over the world.  I investigate these 
groups’ post-Soviet identities through the lens of a Medicare scam involving the first 
population, in which Nina Vatolina’s (1915-2002) 1941 Don’t Gossip! propaganda poster was 
displayed to encourage complicity.  I parse what the poster’s role in the scam indicates about 
the identity of its elderly, Brooklinite viewers, and analyze online, Russian-language 
reactions to the illegal application of Vatolina’s poster for clues into the identity of this 
virtual diasporic group.  I conclude that the former group is limited by its nostalgic 
relationship with its Soviet past, but that the latter group can comfortably vascilate between 
its Soviet and immigrant identities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Photo Credit: Robert Mecea/AP Photo, The Washington Post, July 16, 2010
Figure 1: Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice Lanny Breuer, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York Loretta E. 
Lynch, and law enforcement officials announce the charges against Drivas, Wahl, and others 
at a July 16th 2010 press conference in the U.S. Attorney’s office in Brooklyn.
 On July 16, 2010, the recently formed Department of Justice-Health and Human 
Services Medicare Fraud Strike Force arrested ninety-four people “for their alleged 
participation in schemes to collectively submit more than $251 million in false claims to the 
Medicare program.”  According to a press release from the Department of Justice, the arrests, 
made in Miami, Baton Rouge, Brooklyn, Detroit, and Houston, constituted the “largest 
federal health care fraud takedown since Medicare Fraud Strike Force operations began in 
2007.”1  Within hours, newspapers across the United States had picked up the story, relating 
through Associated Press and authored articles the staggering degree to which doctors, 
nurses, and so-called “professional patients” had profited from lax regulating of Medicare 
claims.  The media exposed to the national eye the techniques the conspirators used, 
including submitting false claims for unnecessary or never rendered services, and 
underscored the federal government’s commitment to work “aggressively-- and 
collaboratively-- to pursue health care criminals...and to bring these offenders to justice.”2 
 The American print media’s reporting focused specifically, however, on the role 
of  “elderly Russian immigrants” in an isolated scam perpetrated by the Bay Medical Care 
clinic, a Russian-speaking health care center in Brooklyn.  Accused of stealing over $72 
million from the federal government, the scam’s organizers, Drs. Gustave Drivas and 
Jonathan Wahl, allegedly paid their patients “in exchange for using their Medicare numbers 
and a bonus fee for recruiting new patients.”3  In the so-called kickback room, where patients 
received bribes, task force agents found a copy of a 1941 agitation-propaganda poster by 
Soviet artist Nina Vatolina (1915-2002) displayed prominently on the wall.  The lithograph, 
originally deployed to discourage viewers from revealing State secrets to the Nazi enemy 
2
1Press Release, “Medicare Fraud Strike Force Charges 94 Doctors, Health Care Company Owners, Executives 
and Others for More Than $251 Million in Alleged False Billing,” United States Department of Justice, Office 
of Public Affairs, July 16, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-ag-821.html.
2Ibid.
3Press Release, “Medicare Fraud Strike Force Charges 94 Doctors, Health Care Company Owners, Executives 
and Others for More Than $251 Million in Alleged False Billing,” United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern 
District of New York, July 16, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2010/2010jul16.html; Kelli Kennedy, 
“36 Arrested in Medicare scams totaling $251 million,” The Washington Times, July 16, 2010, http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/16/36-arrested-medicare-scams-totaling-251-million/
during wartime, depicts a stern-faced woman in a red kerchief with her index finger raised to 
her lips; below her face read the words “Не Болтай!” and the reminder, “будь на чеку, в 
такие дни подслушивают стены.  Недалеко от болтовни и сплетни до измены.”4 
 The poster’s moment in the American spotlight began with an article by New York 
Daily News staff writers Kerry Burke and John Marzulli on July 16, 2010, entitled “82-year-
old, 14 others arrested in $80 million Medicare scheme: cops.”  The piece was published 
following a news conference held by Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of 
the Department of Justice Lanny Breuer at the U.S. Attorney’s office in New York.  During 
the conference, Vatolina’s poster was displayed as evidence against the Brooklyn Bay 
Medical Care clinic.5  It even served as the inspiration for United States Attorney of the 
Eastern District of New York Loretta E. Lynch’s pun that, with the use of surveillance tools 
and personnel, the walls “had ears and they had eyes.”6  
 In their article, Burke and Marzulli not only dwell on Vatolina’s Russian-language 
poster, but also feature a photograph of Lynch standing solemnly next to a reproduction of 
the work displayed on an easel (fig. 1).  The writers report allegations by the clinic’s building 
manager Carlos Bowen that “[patients] came by the ambulette load...hundreds of them.  All 
of them Russian.  They turned away Hispanics, blacks, everybody else.”7  Through their 
3
4“Don’t Gossip!  Be on guard, these days the walls have ears.  Gossip isn’t far from treason.” 
5Kerry Burke, et al., “82- year-old, 14 others arrested in $80 million medicare scheme: cops,” The New York 
Daily News, July 16, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/
2010/07/16/2010-07-16_82yearold_14_others_arrested_in_80_million_medicare_scheme_cops.html; 
Christopher M. Matthews, “Brooklyn Healthcare Fraud Team Makes Big Splash,” Main Justice (blog), July 16, 
2010, http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/07/16/brooklyn-healthcare-fraud-team-makes-big-splash/print/
#comments_controls
6Kelli Kennedy, et al., “Medicare Scams: 94 Charged in Schemes Totaling $251 MILLION,” The Huffington 
Post, July 16, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/17/medicare-scams-94-charged_n_650043.html
7Burke, et al., “82- year-old, 14 others arrested in $80 million medicare scheme: cops.”
focus on Vatolina’s poster, as well as through their emphasis on the perceived nationality of 
the clinic’s patients, Burke and Marzulli paint the clinic as a Russian “Medicare mill where 
‘professional patients’ lined up in a ‘kickback room’ for payoffs.”  They suggest, through 
their visual focus on Vatolina’s poster, a link between the Russian-speaking scammers in 
Brooklyn and the string of unrelated fraud operations busted concurrently throughout the 
country.8  This framing of the crime, facilitated by Vatolina’s poster, was perpetuated in 
publications throughout the nation.
 In bringing to the forefront the alleged ethnicity of the scammers, as well as the 
physicians’ use of a Soviet propaganda poster to communicate with their co-conspirators, the 
Department of Justice and newspaper reporters across the nation made two significant 
assertions about Russian-speaking immigrants.  They suggested that old fears of Stalin’s 
totalitarian regime continue to loom large enough to direct, control, and limit the behavior of 
this population.  Additionally, they imply that this group identifies more strongly with their 
Soviet past than with their American present, allowing them to work with coethnics to cheat 
their host country.  These assertions, which reached a substantial audience through American 
mainstream and Russian-language media outlets, became a portal for defining post-Soviet 
diasporic identity.  Through conversation and debate, Soviet émigrés worldwide attempted to 
negotiate their stance on the issues of generation and nationality brought up by the poster’s 
effective redeployment.  In this way, the poster prompted this population of viewers to 
articulate the relationship between their Soviet pasts and their post-Soviet presents.  
4
8Christopher M. Matthews, “Brooklyn Healthcare Fraud Team Makes Big Splash,” Main Justice (blog), July 16, 
2010, http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/07/16/brooklyn-healthcare-fraud-team-makes-big-splash/print/
#comments_controls
 In this master’s thesis, I am interested in exploring answers to two questions:  
First, what can Drs. Wahl and Drivas’ decision to display Vatolina’s poster in their kickback 
room tell outsiders about their perception of their patients’ post-Soviet identity? And second, 
what do online reactions to their choice reveal about the Russian-language digital diaspora’s 
own post-Soviet identity?  The answers to these questions serve as a window into the 
multiple real and virtual identities of Russian-speaking, ex-Soviet immigrants today.  They 
will provide insight not only into the nostalgic and cultural makeup of these diasporic groups, 
but also into their self-perceptions, and where they position themselves in relation to their 
Soviet past and post-Soviet present.  As we approach the twenty-year anniversary of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, such a portrait acquires a particular salience; by accessing it 
through an event that questions post-Soviet, diasporic identity, I will emerge with a to-the-
minute snapshot of these émigré communities.
 This multidisciplinary master’s thesis draws on theories and methodologies from 
a wide range of fields to answer my research questions.   In my second chapter, I will 
establish how the patients’ reaction to Vatolina’s poster informs an understanding of their 
“self-perceptions of identity and minority status” using reception theory.9  I will then situate 
the poster’s redeployment in a long history of reappropriating official propaganda tools for 
unofficial uses employing art historical and sociological theory.   I will also use cultural, 
linguistic and demographic studies of Soviet-Jewish émigrés in Brooklyn to evaluate their 
susceptibility to the fears, humor, and nostalgias evoked by the poster; I will pay particular 
attention to the perceived rejection of Soviet Jews by American Jews, examining how the 
5
9Janet Staiger, Media Reception Theories (New York, NY: New York University, 2005), 164. 
poster speaks to this problematic relationship.10  Then, I will explore the potential for the 
poster to serve as an advertisement of a particular set of behaviors and services using 
marketing studies.  Finally, I will interweave the unique qualities of the group I identify 
through the poster to characterize this population’s relationship to their Soviet past and 
American present. 
 In my third chapter, where I examine the online, Russian-language reaction to the 
clinic’s use of Vatolina’s poster, I will use studies of computer mediated communication to 
explore the notion of a digital diaspora, explaining how and why the Internet has become a 
locus for post-Soviet identity construction.11  I will utilize linguistic theory to code and 
analyze ten virtual conversations about the case from the standpoint of content, language 
code switching, and avatar development based on fifty-four fundamental criteria.  I will 
indicate how changes in generation and lived experience move this community of readers 
away from the poster’s first horizon of expectation, opening it to new interpretations and 
6
10U.S. Attorney Loretta Lynch reported that, although the conspirators were all in the United States legally, she 
“did not have information about their histories outside this country, such as whether some of them were in the 
KGB or had criminal backgrounds.” (Samuel Newhouse, “Brooklyn Feds Raid Russians in Largest Medicare 
Fraud Ever,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, July 16, 2010, http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?
category_id=4&id=36809).   When concrete information about this patient body is unavailable, I rely on 
historical and demographic facts to substantiate my conclusions about this community’s identity.  “‘Russian’ 
New York is made up of mostly Jewish Russian speakers.” According to sociologist Philip Kasinitz, when Jews 
were permitted to leave the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, over 500,000 emigrated to metropolitan New York.  
Beginning in the 1980s,  Soviet Jewish families formed a “residential enclave and thriving commercial district 
known as ‘Little Odessa’ under the elevated train along Brighton Beach Avenue.”  Thus, while we cannot be 
certain that Drivas and Wahl’s patient body included ethnic Jews, based on this group’s age (over 65), the 
location of the scam (Brooklyn), and the fact that the clinic served Russian-speakers, we can be almost certain 
that it did.  As a result, it would be methodologically remiss to exclude Jewish identity from this discussion.  
(Philip Kasinitz, et al., Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Coming of Age (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), 23, 37 and Annelise Orleck, The Soviet Jewish Americans, Volume 68 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1999), 2).
11Many of these rely heavily on the pioneering work of anthropologist Arjan Appadurai as explored in his text 
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1995).
actualizations.12  I will then apply historian Sheila Fitzpatrick’s definition of Homo sovieticus 
to my findings, showing how the Russian-speaking Internet diaspora has responded to the 
case by picking elements of Soviet, American, Russian, and Jewish culture to create a meta-
identity they can tolerate.
 In my conclusions, I will collate the primary characteristics of post-Soviet identity 
that the answers to these two questions yield.  I will provide insight into how the Russian-
speaking émigré in Brooklyn reconciles her Soviet past and American present, and explore 
how members of the Soviet digital diaspora parse their hybrid identities online.  In exploring 
on what levels this poster resonated with its audiences, and what this indicates about these 
particular groups of viewers, I will demonstrate how Vatolina’s poster functioned as a portal 
for identity construction and evaluation for those who saw it first- and second-hand.  This 
will position me to suggest some further applications of my study, illustrating how this 
research fits into broader conversations about post-Soviet, diasporic identity.
7
12The first horizon of expectation is defined by German pioneer of reception theory Hans Robert Jauss and 
subsequent theoreticians as the horizon projected by the first reading of a work. (Anthony Thiselton, Thiselton 
on Hermeneutics: Collected Works with New Essays (Grand Rapids, MI: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) 
42.) 
CHAPTER 2
COMRADE STALIN, IN THE CLINIC, WITH THE POSTER: LOOKING FOR CLUES 
TO BROOKLYN’S POST-SOVIET IDENTITY
 In this chapter, I explore the question: what does Drs. Drivas and Wahl’s decision 
to display Vatolina’s 1941 lithograph poster in the kickback room of their clinic reveal about 
their patients?  Specifically, I use the patients’ compliance with the poster’s message to 
inform my understanding of this population’s relationship with its Soviet past and American 
present.  Looking through this lens, I draw on scholarly research to examine several cultural 
characteristics of the poster’s clinic audience.  These characteristics inform the portrait of 
post-Soviet identity among elderly, Russian-speaking Jews living in Brooklyn that I paint 
here.  My conclusions in this chapter bring to life one of two diasporic identities I investigate 
in this paper.  They will also position me to explore nuances and developments in post-Soviet 
diasporic identity through comparison with a younger generation of viewers in Chapter 3.  
 It is easy to dismiss reflexively the role of Vatolina’s poster in perpetuating the 
scam in Brooklyn, and to argue instead that bribery motivated these patients to stay quiet.  
Indeed, why would this population relinquish an easy way of making a large sum of money 
in the name of honesty?  However, Drivas and Wahl deliberately selected this particular 
poster to be displayed in their kickback room, and special operatives agents uncovered the 
scam through wire-tapping and undercover reconnaissance, not through informants within 
the patient body.  This indicates that the poster’s message and its viewers’ behavior were 
congruent.  Clearly, the poster resonated with its clinic audience on several levels, and these 
viewers took its message seriously.  The ways in which I propose it did so are supported by 
demographic and attitudinal information provided by contemporary scholarly research.
METHODOLOGY
 Unable to interview Drs. Drivas and Wahl, or the seven co-conspirators arrested 
with them, I draw instead on information and theories gleaned from a variety of academic 
disciplines to answer my research question.13  These include the fields of visual studies, 
media studies, diaspora studies, reception theory, and socio-linguistics.14  I will employ a 
variety of theoretical perspectives to suggest reasons why this specific poster was used to 
communicate with this patient cohort in this scenario.  I will explore what the poster’s 
efficacy tell us about this audience, its relationship with its Soviet pasts, its Jewish identity in 
America, and its attitudes its members as a community.  I will propose several different levels 
on which the poster could resonate with this viewership, tapping scholarly studies of this 
demographic for support and validation.  In aggregate, my research in this section will 
provide a window into this enclave of Soviet immigrants through Vatolina’s poster that will 
serve as a point of comparison with the Internet diasporic community I explore in the next 
chapter.
9
13Those who were arrested include Drs. Drivas and Wahl, along with Sergei Shelikhov, Irina Shelikhova, 
Leonid Zhelesnyakov, Elena Girenko, Katherina Kostiochenko, and Veronykha Tchernytchenko (Press Release, 
“Medicare Fraud Strike Force Charges 94 Doctors, Health Care Company Owners, Executives and Others for 
More Than $251 Million in Alleged False Billing.”)
14This portion of my analysis does not rely substantially on how other émigrés from the former Soviet Union 
living in Brooklyn imagine that they might have read the poster in the Bay Medical Care clinic’s “kickback 
room.”  Although these voices are, from one standpoint, valuable to a discussion of this issue, they may 
minimize or obscure the capacity of this poster to have certain effects on viewers of which they may not be 
aware; this is especially true in a discussion of redeployed propaganda, whose intent is to foster a particular 
attitude in viewers without their knowledge. 
ANALYSIS
 In its original deployment, Nina Vatolina’s poster was designed to articulate and 
reinforce the official ideology of the Soviet state among the masses; in Brooklyn, conversely, 
the work was used to support illegal activity among a group of ex-Soviet, émigré individuals.  
The unique qualities of the Medicare-eligible, Jewish-Soviet audience living in Brooklyn I 
explore here changed substantially the way Nina Vatolina’s poster was read.  The lithograph 
as deployed under Soviet power and this same work deployed in the context of the July 2010 
Medicare scam became available for different interpretations as a result.  Changes in 
viewership, including their ideological frameworks, relationship with the dominant culture, 
and nostalgia for an empire that no longer exists, permitted the same poster to serve these 
two radically different motivations in these two contexts.  
 In its first incarnation, the poster delivered its message to its viewers in a way that 
discouraged any interrogation.  Indeed, like all Soviet propaganda, Vatolina’s poster was 
designed to facilitate a particular, State-sanctioned behavior in a way that would happen 
without the viewer’s conscious awareness.  Art served this goal particularly well under Soviet 
power, where images were understood to have an objective message that resisted the 
convergence of artistic text and meaning through the eyes of the viewer.  Instead, “the range 
of interpretations of the content of a work of art” was considered to be “by no means infinite” 
or equal in value,” recommending visual media as a powerful tool for communicating the 
concrete ideologies of the State.15   The result was a cannon of propagandist works designed 
10
15Evgeny Dobrenko, The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception of Soviet 
Literature (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 80.
to “predigest art for the spectator.”16  This genre of art was thought to obviate the need for 
viewers to formulate their own reading of its messages.  
 In its original deployment, the message of Vatolina was meant to be injected into 
the “inert” Soviet populace according to what political scientist Ellen Mickiewicz terms the  
“hypodermic effects model” of Soviet mass media.  In this model, ideologically-supportive 
slogans, symbols, and visual representations of the State and its people bombard the audience 
in such a way that their meanings are absorbed just as they are presented.17  As a result, the 
hypothetical reader adopts the messages and attitudes they advocate unquestioningly, 
denying her the opportunity to evaluate them.18
 A visual final vocabulary, or the symbolic representation of fundamental concepts, 
is integral to the success of propaganda according to this model.  The late American 
philosopher Richard Rorty first articulated the term final vocabulary in the field of linguistics 
to describe “the words in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes 
retrospectively, the story of our lives.”19  These words, for which there are no synonyms, are 
the only way a language has to identify such abstract notions as “true,” “good,” “right,” and 
“beautiful.”  Without these words, it is impossible to express these fundamental ideas short of 
defining and explaining them.  
11
16Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” in Pollock and After: The Critical Debate ed. Francis 
Frascina (New York: NY, Routledge, 2000), 55.
17Ellen Mickiewicz, Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 181.
18A hypothetical reader is defined by Peter Rabinowitz as “all those ideal readers whose existence is created by 
the critic himself or herself...included in this category, for example is the narratee...the fictional counterpart of 
the narrator, the person to whom the narrator directs the story.” (Peter Rabinowitz,”Whirl without End: 
Audience-Oriented Criticism,” in Contemporary Literary Theory ed. George Douglas Atkins, et al. (Amherst, 
MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), 83.) 
19Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 73.
 A visual final vocabulary, then, is a set of symbols that allows the deployer to 
express these fundamental concepts without encouraging the viewer to define them.  In 
official propaganda, a visual final vocabulary allows the State to shape and direct the 
collective understanding of important ideological ideas through images.  The Soviet Union’s 
propaganda machine sought to conceive of and enforce an ideologically-supporting, visual 
final vocabulary for all its citizens as a way of maintaining control over them.  In doing so, it 
successfully usurped images like that of a red star, a sickle and hammer, or a kerchiefed 
peasant woman, ascribing a specific meaning to them within the context of Soviet power.  It 
accomplished this not only on flags and in film, but also, and perhaps most effectively, using 
a fixed visual lexicon displayed on propaganda posters.20   The most compelling of these 
posters used visual cues that resonated with the greatest number of viewers, including 
generalized images of people, places, and situations that excluded few and avoided 
misreading.21  As sociologist Victoria Bonnell argues, the repetition of this ubiquitous visual 
vocabulary on propaganda posters like Vatolina’s turned works of art into indexical signs, 
imbuing them with ideological significance and State-constructed referents;22 this ascription 
of meaning, in turn, allowed these posters to function as heuristic short cuts for their viewers, 
who adopted their messages immediately, without interrogating them.23    
12
20Theresa Sabonis-Chafee, “Communism as Kitsch,” in Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and Society 
since Gorbachev, ed. Adele Marie Barker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 365; Lev Trotsky, 
“Vodka, the Church and the Cinema,” in Problems of Life by Lev Trotsky (London, UK: Methuen & Co., 1924)
21Karen Petrone, “Motherland Calling?” in Picturing Russia: Explorations in Visual Culture ed. Joan Neuberger 
and Valerie Kivelson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 199.
22Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 3.
23According to O’Shaughnessy, when used in visual propaganda, symbols show consumers in explicit, but easy 
to process, terms how the propagandist feels without inviting scrutiny or interpretation of her point of view. 
(Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction, (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 2004), 6.)
 In her text, “Communism as Kitsch,” visual studies scholar Theresa Sabonis-
Chafee draws a connection between the implementation of the hypodermic effects model to 
inject a visual final vocabulary into the masses, and what twentieth century Czech politician 
and philosopher Vaclav Havel called the “auto-totality of society.”  “As the vocabulary of the 
system becomes increasingly internalized--as the ‘correct’ answers become more reflexive,” 
she contends, “the individual becomes more complicit, even if he or she does not fully 
believe the words of the vocabulary.”24  According to this philosophy, then, the original 
Soviet audience of Vatolina’s poster was meant to understand reflexively and immediately 
the message it was designed to convey.  Because of the autototality propaganda posters 
facilitated in this monolithic political atmosphere, their viewers, according to Sabonis-
Chafee, supported the system’s rule unquestioningly, while suffering under it at the same 
time.
  This is not, however, the model according to which Vatolina’s poster was 
redeployed in the Medicare scam revealed in July of 2010.  Indeed, substantial changes in 
implied reader, context, and horizon of lived experience in Brooklyn allowed different 
aspects of the work to come into view before its elderly, ex-Soviet audience.25  New 
“conditions of access and conditions of appearance” resulting from the poster’s 
recontextualization opened the work to additional, secondary meanings in the Bay Medical 
13
24Sabonis-Chafee, “Communism as Kitsch,” 365; Havel himself writes that, “if ideology originally facilitates 
(by acting outwardly) the constitution of power by serving as a psychological excuse, then from the moment 
that excuse is accepted, it constitutes power inwardly, becoming an active component of that power.  It begins to 
function as the principal instrument of ritual communication within the system of power.” (Vaclav Havel, “The 
Power of the Powerless,” in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe, 
ed. John Keane (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), 31.)
25Wolfgang Iser, How To Do Theory (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2006) 68.
Care clinic; these changes and consistencies provide insight into characteristics of the 
poster’s viewing audience that I explore here.26  
 This understanding of the historical life of art as a triangular interaction between 
author, work, and public was first articulated by German pioneer of reception theory Hans 
Robert Jauss; his scholarship is predicated on the notion that, “because a work [of art] does 
not have an inherent meaning,” but rather “becomes actualized....at the moment of its 
reception by a community of viewers,” it is available for multiple readings when deployed in 
new contexts before new audiences.27  Jauss calls the first reception of a work of art its 
“horizon of expectations” (Erwartungshorizont), a concept described by art historian Paul 
Smith as “a kind of historical stage against which the work is illuminated, poised to engage 
its prospective spectators.”28   As readers’ horizons of lived experience grow and change with 
subsequent generations and historical contexts, new aspects of the work become apparent to 
different viewers.  A work of art only becomes “actualized” upon a “fusion of two historical 
horizons, those of its history and its audience consummated;” in the context of the July 2010 
Medicare scam, changes in population, generation, and ethnic identity shaped the way this 
actualization occured.29 
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 This is not to say, however, that the original reading of Vatolina’s poster by its 
ideal audience were lost entirely upon its redeployment in Brooklyn.30  Indeed, because the 
poster “came into existence in a specific historical moment and therefore continues to carry 
the charge of its origin into its present reception,” the original message of Vatolina’s work, 
don’t gossip, continued to be accessed by viewers seventy years later in Brooklyn.31  That 
viewers read and heeded this warning in the poster provides insight into their ongoing 
relationship with the socio-historical context in which Vatolina’s work debuted.  The degree 
to which this group’s reaction coincides with the poster’s first horizon of expectation 
indicates how firmly it clings to or rejects Soviet identity; this makes Vatolina’s poster a 
powerful and appropriate tool for assessing post-Soviet identity, especially absent the 
opportunity for interaction with the deployers or viewing population.
  Owing to their age, many among the patient viewership likely consumed the 
poster in its original deployment, meaning that they shaped and were shaped by the work’s 
first horizon of expectation.  However, skepticism and negativity toward the regime present 
among an audience of elderly, Jewish ex-Soviets in Brooklyn affected the degree to which 
the poster’s message could be directly injected into their subconscious.32  Instead, I argue, the 
poster was deployed and received here, first, in a humorous and ironic way, based on this 
community’s horizon of lived experience.  By reappropriating an official symbol for an anti-
official use, Drs. Drivas and Wahl advertise an irreverent, tongue-in-cheek attitude toward 
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the former Soviet State and, by association, toward American governmental authority.  That 
they believed this treatment would resonate with their audience evidences this group’s 
negative relationship with official Soviet life and authority.  
 This particular reuse of a Soviet propaganda poster is a continuation of a long 
tradition of socialist humor that treats ideological symbols ironically in order to call into 
question the authority of the state.  Referred to in its late Soviet incarnation as stiob, this type 
of humor “differed from sarcasm or derision.  It required a certain overidentification with the 
ideological symbols exposed to such treatment, often to the point that it was almost 
impossible to tell whether the symbols were supported or de-legitimized by subtle ridicule.”33  
By reusing a Soviet propaganda poster to communicate an important, unofficial message to 
their patients, Wahl and Drivas downplay the seriousness of their actions, encouraging their 
audience to view them with humor and irony.  I posit that this stiob-like treatment of 
Vatolina’s work in America could have prompted its viewers to disregard the authority of the 
American government and its ideologies.34  
 In employing this type of humor to communicate with their patients, Drivas and 
Wahl evidence not only this viewership’s familiarity with Soviet symbols, but also its 
appreciation for an irreverent treatment of them; this suggests a complexity in this 
population’s relationship with the former Soviet Union, where profound disappointment in 
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public life and tender nostalgia for private life dwell together in the collective memory.35   
This paradoxical attitude coincides with this age group’s many contradictory life experiences:  
As historian Donald Raleigh indicates in his book, Russia’s Sputnik Generation: Soviet Baby 
Boomers Talk About Their Lives, the first Soviet generations both witnessed “success in 
transforming the country into the other superpower,” and survived “shortages, deprivations, 
famine, arbitrary terror, relentless mobilization of people and resources, and a horrific war 
with its many telling consequences.”36  As a result of these tumultuous times, this generation 
experienced inflated expectations for a better life and deep disappointment in the failure of 
State institutions to invoke change.37  Through the performative shift of its 
decontextualization by Wahl and Drivas, the poster highlights for viewers incongruities 
“between messages and cultural forms in the official and nonofficial spheres;” because of its 
redeployment in Brooklyn, it underscores that these dissonances exist here in the United 
States as well.38  
 Drawing on their patient body’s existing frustration with the inadequacies and 
cultural complexities of the American health care system, the poster encourages viewers to 
feel let down by official government safety nets designed to protect citizens; this in turn 
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35Narspy Zilberg, “In-Group Humor of Immigrants from the former Soviet Union to Israel,” in Language and 
Communication in Israel, ed. Hannah Herzog and Eliezer Ben-Rafael (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
Rutgers: The State University, 2001), 130.
36Donald Raleigh, Russia’s Sputnik Generation: Soviet Baby Boomers Talk About Their Lives (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 5.
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facilitates a disaffection with and disrespect for the State’s power.39   This reaction parallels 
the disappointments in the shortcomings of Soviet institutions that eventually catalyzed the 
USSR’s collapse, ones that Wahl and Drivas may have hoped to revive through Vatolina’s 
poster.40  This use of stiob-like humor suggests that the doctors may have hoped to redirect 
their patients’ disappointment in Soviet State authority toward a disregard for American State 
authority.  With this in mind, I suggest that the poster may have helped to rationalize 
Medicare fraud among this population by harnessing ongoing negative feelings about the 
Soviet system.
 By reusing a propaganda poster in an unofficial way, Wahl and Drivas 
communicate the behavior they seek from their patients while playing into an apolitical 
disregard for the rules of the American system already in place within this community.41  
They accomplish this by decontextualizing an official Soviet symbol, encouraging a 
humorous but skeptical attitude toward State authority that I read as indicative of their 
patients’ troubled relationship with their country of origin.  In spite of this dislike for Soviet 
society, however, Wahl and Drivas’ reuse of Vatolina’s poster also evidences a disinterest in 
engaging with and assimilating to American society.  This is an attitude, according to 
scholarly research, prominent among elderly, non-English speaking Soviet immigrants in the 
United States.  Because the poster’s message in its original context suggested that spies were 
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all around, in its American context it heightens distrust for cultural outsiders and advocates 
an intense reliance on fellow Russophones for viewers of this generation.42  By positioning 
the American government and its agents as the enemy in the friend/foe dichotomy established 
by Vatolina’s poster, Drivas and Wahl reinforce the “shared dislike of American values and 
cultural patterns” felt by older Soviet émigrés in Brooklyn.  This helps sustain the “negative 
relationship...between acculturation and the American and Russian cultures” already extant in 
Brooklyn and especially the Brighton Beach neighborhood.43  
 Because this population is not only Soviet, but also Jewish, its attitude toward the 
dominant culture is additionally complicated by its ambivalent relationship with American 
Jews.  Although this group’s emigration to the United States was facilitated primarily by the 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, its subsequent integration into New York Jewish life 
encountered many roadblocks.  Therefore, in deploying this poster to discourage contact with 
those outside the scam, Wahl and Drivas resonate with this population’s existing “feelings of 
being rejected by American Jews.”  As a result, the patient body was motivated to “turn away 
from Americans” and “toward other Russian Jews,” enabling a self-isolation of this enclave 
of viewers from the dominant culture that facilitated their complicity with the scam.44  
 This feeling of rejection finds its root in the significant religious identity shift 
undertaken by members of this population after their arrival in Brooklyn.45  From an imposed 
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Jewish identity leading to persecution under Soviet power, this group expected the chance to 
embrace their Jewishness after moving to the United States.  This transformation was 
motivated in many ways by the immense social and political capital available to Russian 
Jews in the United States.46  This increased emphasis on Jewish identity was reinforced by 
the
 many instances [in Soviet history] in which Jews were identified as the primary 
 source of the country’s ills...the consequence of this scapegoating has often been 
 severe violence and repression directed against Jews – including, at different 
 times, pogroms, purges, show trials, professional and educational quotas, bans on 
 religious expression and ridicule in the popular culture.47  
In the United States, Soviet Jews hoped, they could finally celebrate openly this identity that 
had historically both defined and isolated them.   
 In fact, while the Soviet State and society subordinated this population because of 
their Jewishness, American Jews rejected them for being too “Russian” (Soviet).48  In large 
part, this was owing to the fact that Soviet Jewish immigrants did not publicly practice their 
religion in the same way as American Jews, as well as to other cultural and linguistic 
distinctions.  As anthropologist Fran Markowitz writes, 
 Use of the Russian language, added to the unexpectedly demanding behavior at 
 Jewish agencies and a surprisingly low amount of synagogue attendance on the 
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 part of the immigrants combined to shape American Jews’ perception of these 
 Jewish immigrants as ‘Russians’.49  
This resulted in what can be termed the “supreme irony” of this population’s immigration 
experience: they were too Jewish to be Russian in the USSR, and too Soviet to be Jewish 
here.50  
 I suggest that this irony opens the door to several other readings of Vatolina’s 
poster in its Brooklyn context.  The most significant of these, from the standpoint of identity, 
is that the poster urges these viewers not to reveal the scam to outsiders because of the ways 
it would detriment their acculturation into the American Jewish community.  Indeed, one of 
the poster’s messages in its redeployment is to keep the fraudulent kickbacks quiet from 
those who would attribute them to “religiously nonobservant, uninformed, and...culturally 
Russian” outsiders, further precluding this population from becoming Jews in the United 
States.51  This reading suggests that this viewership perceives that it has a negative reputation 
among American Jews, and evidences its desire to integrate into the greater Jewish 
community more fully.
 In addition to this interpretation, however, Drivas and Wahl’s deployment of the 
poster in this way also indicates that they hope to hide behaviors that mark them as Soviet, 
rather than eliminate them.  This reading of the poster, then, helps to reinforce this group’s 
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unified isolation outside the dominant American culture and American Jewish identity.  
Through this use of the poster, Wahl and Drivas position the scam as the behavior of a 
“separate sub-group (apart from American Jews)” where their patient body can be “the Jews 
they have learned to be in the Soviet context.”52  It helps link the co-conspirators to an 
identity they continue to perceive as having deep cultural meaning (Soviet Jewish) rather 
than to one that elicits negative stereotyping by the dominant culture (“Russian”/Soviet).53   
In this reading, the slogan, Не Болтай! seems to suggest that viewers keep the scam private 
from outsiders for whom it would reinforce stereotypes about “Russians;”  at the same time 
however, it is being used to encourage the very Soviet behaviors that form the basis of these 
detrimental stereotypes in the United States. 54
 In facilitating a split between Soviet Jewish and American Jewish identities, the 
poster’s message also helps reinforce a mentality of trustworthiness and solidarity among its 
elderly Russian-speaking audience in its new context.  The poster reminds viewers of their 
obligation to fellow Russophone scammers not to expose their co-conspirators should they be 
caught because it evokes their shared language and history.   The linguistic and cultural 
characteristics of the “Don’t Gossip!” poster among this group of viewers reinforces that “all 
involved will keep their mouths shut; that if anyone is caught, he or she will not give up the 
others; and that the conspirators will do what they say they are going to do” because of the 
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group’s common heritage.55  In this way, the poster plays on and provides support for the idea 
of trustworthiness inherent among members of the same socio-linguistic ethnicity.  This is 
predicated on the extant notion within this community that a shared cultural background and 
kinship bind and obligate individuals to one another in “ramified interpersonal 
connections...within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and 
enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.”56  
 As Drivas and Wahl’s deployment of this poster indicates, this attitude is 
widespread among this elderly Soviet émigré audience in Brooklyn, and results in a 
correlative lack of behavioral and identity assimilation with the dominant American culture.  
Among this viewership, the xenophobic attitude toward ethnic outsiders Vatolina’s poster 
illustrates prevents this community from fully incorporating their American identity into their 
Russian-speaking Jewish identity.  This factor limits the range of people with whom this 
group interacts, ensuring that certain attitudes and cultural norms are preserved.57  In 
establishing an environment where members of the same background are motivated to 
deceive outsiders by a poster from the former Soviet Union, the doctors introduce the svoi/
chiuzhye paradigm frequently used in Soviet society to distinguish “us” from “them.”  This 
indicates where this audience positions itself in relation to its Soviet past, as well as to its 
new American homeland and compatriots.58
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 Aside from the poster’s ability to disenfranchise Soviet authority while preserving 
a Soviet Jewish identity, it is significant that Drivas and Wahl specifically selected a Stalinist 
propaganda poster to display in their kickback room.  The doctors’ decision to reuse 
Vatolina’s work provides insight into the generation of their intended audience and this 
group’s awareness of Soviet law.  For viewers who are familiar with the context in which 
Vatolina’s poster first debuted, the work in both its original and new contexts conveys a two-
fold message. The first part of the message is that revealing secrets about the collective will 
make the collective vulnerable to outsiders.  The second part of the message is that there are 
punishments for betrayal that are both harsh and quick to be administered.  The poster warns 
viewers in both its original and new contexts not to expose the group.  To reveal to disguised 
outsiders state or scam secrets would hurt the well-being of the collective while, on a more 
basic level, attracting authorities’ attention to the existence of the group.59 
 Owing to their age and lived experience, there can be little doubt that the elderly 
Russian-speaking immigrants in Wahl and Drivas’ clinic were aware of the punishment for 
treason to which the poster tacitly alludes.  Treason was, according to Soviet constitution 
Article 64, the most serious crime committable in the Soviet Union, and warranted 
“deprivation of freedom for a term of ten to fifteen years with confiscation of property with 
or without additional exile for a term of two to five years, or by death with confiscation of 
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property.”60  What this audience could not know, however, is what the consequences for 
treason would be in the poster’s redeployed context.  Because of the criminal, rather than 
official, scenario in which the poster was reused, audience members in Brooklyn could only 
infer what would happen if anyone intentionally or inadvertently revealed the scam to 
authorities.  By redeploying an artifact from the Stalinist era of Soviet power, Drivas and 
Wahl emphasize the aesthetic distance between the “horizons of expectation of the work’s 
first readers and that of later readers.”  This process helped its Brooklyn viewers “highlight 
and re-engage what was so provocative of horizontal change on the level of aesthetic and, 
ultimately, lived experience” in the poster’s original deployment.61  The audience’s 
awareness that there would be consequences for betraying the collective derived from the 
context of the poster’s Soviet usage; in Brooklyn, Drivas and Wahl used this awareness to 
enforce complicity with the work’s message. 
 By electing to use an image produced under Stalin and during World War II, Wahl 
and Drivas indicate that their patients are old enough to understand and be motivated by the 
poster’s twofold message.  They also show that this group is capable enough at speaking 
(seeing) Bolshevik to remain complicit with its message in order to gain the rewards 
provided by the scam while avoiding punishment.62  The group was intended to recognize the 
socio-historical, generational context of the poster, reinforcing a fear of exposing the scam 
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organizers or participants.   Additionally, Drivas and Wahl’s use of this poster also evidences 
their audience’s disinterest in cultural assimilation in favor of retaining their Russian-
speaking, Soviet-Jewish identities.    Indeed, the friend/foe dichotomy posited by the poster 
in its new context coincides with this group’s belief in the trustworthiness of their compatriot 
conspirators.  The way the poster plays on preexisting fears, distrusts, and attitudes toward 
American government and society makes it a particularly effective tool for enforcing 
complicity among this group of age-appropriate viewers.63
 In positioning Russian-speakers as members of a trust network based on ethnic 
and cultural similarities, Vatolina’s poster underscores the Soviet past that unites its audience. 
The poster evokes the common social memories of this group that persist in spite of post-
emigration changes in class, religion, and rates of assimilation to the dominant culture.  By 
displaying an image that speaks to these shared experiences, the doctors at the Bay Medical 
Care clinic, I suggest, gained access to their patients’ nostalgias for another time and place 
that exists in spite of their resentment toward the Soviet State and system.64  Invoking this 
collective nostalgia may have helped the doctors gain their audience’s complicity in the 
scam.   
 The poster’s potential to elicit nostalgia in its viewers evidences another aspect of 
this population’s complex relationship with the former Soviet Union; the potential for a piece 
26
63“An immigrant cannot be expected to acquire American attitudes if the individual does not assimilate--for 
example, if he or she does not learn English...Aging [also] slows attitude change and tends to produce more 
conservative positions on social problems.” (Victor Goldenberg, et al., “Social Attitudes of Russian Immigrants 
to the United States,” The Journal of Social Psychology 136, No. 4 (1996): 423.)
64This phenomenon, whereby relics from the Soviet period take on a nostalgic appeal in spite of their 
relationship with the many problems of the Soviet era, relate to their ability to “restore an unambiguous point of 
departure, a return to a neat and stable social taxonomy.” (Serguei Alex Oushakine, “Crimes of Substitution: 
Detection in Late Soviet Society,” Public Culture 15, No. 3 (2003): 431.)
of redeployed kitsch to resonate with those who left the USSR voluntarily indicates that their 
attitude toward their former homeland is not entirely negative.  Drawing on scholar and 
media artist Svetlana Boym’s (1966- ) writings about the power of images in fostering Soviet 
nostalgia, I propose that this poster elicited a specific type of nostalgia in those who viewed it 
in the post-Soviet United States.  This nostalgic response, I argue, suggests a positive 
relationship to certain aspects of Soviet private life, youth, and feelings of belonging among 
some of its former citizens.  
 Vatolina’s poster serves as an artifact of the original, personal context in which 
viewers remember it in its American context.  Consequently, the poster hung in the clinic 
kickback room may have prompted viewers to feel a sense of longing for “the very real 
humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism 
afforded--often in spite of the [Soviet] state’s proclaimed goals.”65  A loss in authority and 
professional status as well as a feeling of helplessness as a result of cultural and language 
barriers upon moving to the United States positions this viewership to miss elements of their 
old life that the poster accesses.66  These emotions can exist in spite of indifference or 
opposition to official State ideologies, and are strengthened by approaching older, visual texts 
from the perspective of new lived experiences.  Indeed, as the space between the first horizon 
of expectation and the current horizon grows, there is continual interplay between modified 
expectations and transformed memories in viewers’ interpretations of these works.  The result 
27
65Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, 8.
66Tanya Fitzpatrick, et al., “Older Russian Immigrants to the USA: Their Utilization of Health Care Services,” 
International Social Work 43, No. 307 (2000) 
is a partially nostalgic reading that departs sharply from the first horizon of expectation 
experienced by the ideal audience.67  
 The particular type of inconclusive and fragmentary nostalgia that Vatolina’s 
poster could access has been identified by Boym as ironic nostalgia.68  As Boym indicates, 
this manifestation of nostalgia relies on a re-conceptualizing of “home” as a mythical place 
that may have never existed as it is remembered in the here and now.  This type of nostalgia 
can only be accessed from afar, whether from another time or another place, or both.  It is a 
“romance with one’s own fantasy” that would disintegrate if confronted with the realities of 
that past.69  
 Boym also suggests that this nostalgia, or an “ache of temporal distance and 
displacement,” is cured by “a return home, preferably a collective one.”70  She emphasizes 
that the desire to return home is not rooted in a sense of longing, but rather in the anxiety that  
is prompted by those who point out historical incongruities between past and present. 
Because nostalgics want to replace history with a private or collective mythology of their 
pasts, neither the individual nor the group can be permitted to question “the wholeness and 
continuity of the restored tradition.”71  In this way, the poster served as a particularly 
powerful nostalgic tool in the common space that is the Bay Medical Care clinic.
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 I suggest that Wahl and Drivas recognized the potential for Vatolina’s poster to 
help viewers escape from their vulnerable and insecure present to an identity in their 
remembered past that felt richer, more secure, and more appealing.72  In displaying the 
poster, the doctors may have sought to increase the appeal of its message by helping viewers 
to identify with past versions of themselves, reclaiming their place in the now-absent 
collective through their nostalgic remembrances.73  The type of remembering Vatolina’s 
poster provokes could help viewers to construct and reconstruct their own identities, 
reinforcing their membership in a cohort with others who share that same sense of self.  This 
process is particularly important for older immigrants who report in studies missing 
“concrete local sights or places remembered from their youth,” like the collection of physical 
artifacts of which Vatolina’s poster is a part.74 
 These qualities of Vatolina’s poster suggest that Wahl and Drivas were aware of 
their viewers’ nostalgia for certain elements of Soviet life.  By displaying the poster, they 
indicate an understanding of the “fascinating mixture of sarcasm and nostalgia” for socialism 
that both characterizes and limits this audience.75  Through the poster, the doctors 
communicate that they ascribe to this contradictory nostalgic worldview even as they make 
fun of it, increasing the appeal and acceptability of their scam in the eyes of their patients.  
This evocation of nostalgia through images, called the fin de siècle phenomenon, has been 
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used to great effect in American advertising for the baby-boomer generation over the past 
two decades.76  Its success speaks to the ability of nostalgic images to elicit in the consumer a 
feeling of membership in a “supportive network that reconnects ‘old friends’ in a family-like 
structure.”77  This is a particularly compelling force for older Soviet émigrés, many of whom 
find themselves lacking not only the physical subsistence provided by the State but also the 
sense of competency and self to which they had grown accustomed in the Soviet Union.78
 The fin de siècle phenomenon’s power is evidenced by the popularity of 
“nostalgia-evoking products and appeals” in post-Soviet advertisements in Russia.  As 
marketing specialists Susan Holak, Alexei Matveev, and William Havlena found in their 
study, in the past several years “new products have been introduced by Russian marketers to 
appeal explicitly to Russian consumers’ nostalgic feelings...since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.”79  The notable success of these advertisements/packagings evidences the power of 
Soviet national symbols to sate a desire for the normalcy and security provided by the Soviet 
period.  While some products have been reconfigured to evoke nostalgic feelings, others 
simply revert to the images they used under Soviet power.  These nostalgic advertisements 
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78Brod, et. al., “Older Russian Emigrés and Medical Care.”; it is also significant to note that “Cold war 
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79Susan Holak, et al., “Nostalgia in post-socialist Russia: Exploring applications to advertising strategy,” 
Journal of Business Research 61, No. 2 (February 2008): 176.
signal to consumers that their producers recognize and sympathize with a longing for select 
elements of the past.
 In choosing to redeploy a Soviet poster, the doctors at the Bay Medical Care 
clinic, I posit, employed the same strategy used by post-Soviet advertisers to appeal to 
potential consumers.   They utilized kitsch to signify their ability to provide the stability and 
security consumers lost with emigration to the United States.  At the same time, by using 
Vatolina’s work in this way, they underscore the inability of the American health care system 
to provide that same stability.  Their reuse of Vatolina’s poster to this end suggests that this 
group of viewers craves the familiarity and consistency of the Soviet Union, if not its day-to-
day hardships; this quality helps reframe the kickbacks the patients received as a reclaiming 
of Soviet financial stability rather than as a reward for compliance with illegality.80  
 The ability of Vatolina’s poster to evoke nostalgia is also linked to the fact that it, 
like others produced under Soviet power, was designed to be a referent of other common 
histories and myths.  It successfully reinforced this collective history through its ubiquitous 
and consistent deployment across the entire Soviet Union.  In a nation of largely illiterate 
peasants, Bolshevik leaders and political artists struggled to find a visual language through 
which to communicate convincingly their social and political ambitions to the people.81   In 
order to resonate with the greatest numbers, Bolshevik propagandists elected to draw on 
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Adele Marie Barker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 51, 61.)
81In 1918, close to 85 percent of Russians lived in villages. (Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet 
Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin, 22.)
preexisting, familiar images from “religious and folk art, classical mythology, Russian 
painting, and the imagery of Western European labor and revolutionary movements.”82  
These quotations from other artistic contexts helped viewers reinterpret paradigms with 
which they had become familiar elsewhere (the holy and the damned) in a new political 
climate (heroes and class enemies).83  These posters were designed using this lexicon to help 
viewers understand and support this new political regime as a continuation of other eternal 
struggles that touched their daily lives.
 Vatolina’s poster and others like it, then, encompass a myriad of other histories 
and institutions that go beyond that of the Soviet era in which they were originally deployed.  
Viewers of the poster are prompted to feel nostalgic not only for the past through which they 
themselves lived, but also for an eternal and collective conception of home and national 
myth.84  In deploying and redeploying Vatolina’s poster, its multiple contexts are bound up in 
one another, endowing the visual vocabulary it uses with a range of polysemic meaning: like 
the matreshka doll so often used to symbolize Russia, each history and context is absorbed 
and encased in the next history or context as the poster is conceived of, deployed, and 
redeployed on a forward-moving time line.  Vatolina’s poster, then, took on several different 
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83Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin, 23.
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World,” Diplomatic History 25, No. 3 (December 2002): 443.)  Scholar Led Gudkov even goes so far as to 
assert that the legacy of the War and the cultural trauma it brought about in the Soviet Union are “the most 
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Gudkov, “The Fetters of Victory: How the War Provides Russia With Its Identity,” Eurozine, May 3, 2005, 
http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2005-05-03-gudkov-en.pdf, 1.)
context-specific meanings when displayed by Wahl and Drivas; it acquired the ability to 
prompt not only negative memories of the Soviet state, but also positive associations with 
conceptions of the homeland, belonging, and memory.
 Sociologist Georgia Lagoumitzi finds that the use of nostalgia as a point of appeal 
for ethnic minorities, refugees and immigrants reinforces their status as outsiders in the 
dominant society by positing the idyllic nostalgic home against the challenging new home.  
In her study of repatriated Pontic Greeks, she concludes that, “nostalgia allows evasion from 
the coercion of social bonds by searching for a ‘home’ outside the hegemonic logic of the 
national group.”85  Nostalgia positions the remembered home favorably against the current 
place of residence when, as scholar Andreea Deciu Ritivoi suggests in her text Yesterday’s 
Self: Nostalgia and the Immigrant Identity, “the nostalgic attempts to rebuild a lost world, to 
rediscover her lost paradise” by “relating the new environment to the old, familiar one.”86  
The potential for Vatolina’s poster to access a nostalgic vision of the past is related to this 
audience’s difficulty finding a new identity within the structure of present.87  By invoking a 
comparison of the poster’s original deployment with its Brooklyn recontextualization, Wahl 
and Drivas underscore the “hermeneutic differences between the former and the current 
understanding of the work,” raising to consciousness the “history of its reception, which 
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Greek Refugees” (paper presented at Diasporas: Exploring Critical Issues, 3rd Global Conference, Mansfield 
College, Oxford, July 7-9, 2010), 5.
86Andreea Deciu Ritivoi, Yesterday’s Self: Nostalgia and the Immigrant Identity, 137.
87For a more in-depth discussion of the details of this process, see Andreea Deciu Ritivoi, “The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being,” in Yesterday’s Self: Nostalgia and the Immigrant Identity. 
mediates both positions.”88  The result is a measuring of past against present where the past, 
and therefore, the space and mentality where it is deployed, are always favored. 
 In this chapter, I have explored and suggested answers to my first research 
question, assessing why Drs. Drivas and Wahl chose to redeploy Nina Vatolina’s 1941 Soviet 
poster in the kickback room of their clinic.  Using scholarly studies to contextualize the 
different ways in which Vatolina’s poster could resonate with its Brooklyn audience, I 
uncover four likely characteristics of this patient group:  I find that, while their attitude 
toward the Soviet State may be irreverent, their memories of their personal pasts are, at least 
in part, nostalgic.  I also determine that, although this cohort lives in America, they relate 
more closely to their Soviet identities.  This combination of characteristics indicates that this 
group has, in many ways, resisted forging a new, hybrid identity combining the past and the 
present.  The multiplicity of identities experienced by these elderly, Russian-speaking Jews 
limits identity construction rather than encourages it, and compels them to obey the 
exhortation of Vatolina’s poster.  
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CHAPTER 3
“THESE DAYS, EVEN THE WALLS HAVE EARS”: LISTENING TO THE VOICES OF 
THE POST-SOVIET, DIGITAL DIASPORA
 In the previous chapter, I answered my first research question, using Vatolina’s 
poster to access characteristics of the Soviet diaspora community involved in Drivas and 
Wahl’s scam.   In this chapter, I tackle my second question:  How have Russian-speakers 
worldwide reacted to the role of Vatolina’s work in a scam that defrauded the American 
government?  Widespread media coverage of the poster, which was seized as evidence in 
court proceedings against the Bay Medical Care clinic staff and patients, attracted the 
attention of Russian-speakers worldwide; that the image serves as the de facto illustration for 
a crime committed by “Russian” émigrés has elicited diverse reactions among members of 
the Soviet diaspora.  The poster’s use, and the American print and sound media’s fixation on 
it, has motivated this population to consider and debate their many intersecting national, 
post-national, religious, and cultural identities.  
 In this chapter, I will focus on virtual, Russian-language reactions to the English-
language media’s focus on Vatolina’s poster.  Using content analysis of ten diverse, Russian 
language discussions of the case, I will highlight key themes in these reactions to Vatolina’s 
poster that provide insights into the self-perceived identity of members of the Soviet Union’s 
digital diaspora.  Like the previous chapter, which sought to explore the unique 
characteristics of the clinic’s target audience as revealed by the poster, this chapter will paint 
a dynamic picture of members of the Russian-speaking digital diaspora through their reaction 
to the poster.  Nearly twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the appearance of 
this poster in Brooklyn and the academic and popular conversations it has sparked provide a 
contemporary window into the relationship between Russian-speakers, the former Soviet 
Union, and their new homes.  
 Because the Internet has become a vital sphere in which Russian-speakers all over 
the world interact with one another, my analysis of Russian-language reactions to Vatolina’s 
poster will also contribute to ongoing scholarly conversations about “digital diasporas,” 
which are becoming an increasingly important way of studying cultural identity.89  
Specifically, I hope to show how the online material I analyze fits into the larger role of 
“digital diasporas” in producing “rituals of maintaining solidarity in communities, of 
commemorating and mourning, of mocking others’ versions of history and their memories.”90  
In examining the online reactions to Vatolina’s poster’s media presence, I provide a topical 
trope through which to explore the many different affiliations and allegiances with which 
Soviet immigrants self-identify online.  By analyzing Russian-language responses to one 
particular issue, I illustrate the myriad intersecting identities Soviet immigrants perform two 
decades after the collapse of the USSR.
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 The misrepresentations of Russian involvement in the scams nationwide brought 
about by the American media’s focus on Vatolina’s poster elicited a wide range of reactions 
on Russian-language online news sites, blogs, and forums.  These responses, while divided 
according to self-identified national, religious, and cultural lines, represent a global attempt 
on the part of Russian-speakers online to situate themselves individually and as a community 
in relation to their Soviet pasts and post-Soviet presents.  Using the commenting capabilities 
of online newspapers, as well as those on blogs and chat sites, Russian-speakers all over the 
world are engaging with the cultural implications of the American media’s obsession with 
Vatolina’s poster.  These online conversations provide the various ethnic niche of the greater 
immigrant population with the opportunity to compare itself with stereotypes about 
“Russians” brought up by the American media’s fixation on Vatolina’s poster.  In short, for 
all Russian-speaking groups, the use of the poster by the doctors in the Bay Medical Care 
clinic and its subsequent spotlight in the media have introduced a portal for creating and 
establishing culture and nationality; the poster has thus been redeployed a third time as a tool 
for defining post-Soviet, global identity.  Here, I seek to explore what is being said in this 
conversation, and how repeated motifs compare and contrast with the conclusions I drew in 
my first chapter.  
INFORMATION ON INTERNET IDENTITY
 Before I begin my analysis, it is important to note how the use of Internet data as 
the basis for an identity conversation to the exclusion of other types of communication, 
including face-to-face interaction, both enhance and problematize my conclusions.  First, 
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because the Internet is largely geared toward younger people, older people, including many 
first-generation immigrants from the former Soviet Union, may be excluded in some way 
from this conversation.91  This means that I focus here on a community from a different 
generation than that which I examined in my first chapter.92  Second, demographic 
information about the people participating in this online conversation is typically not 
provided in order to protect users’ anonymity.93  While this is, in some ways, problematic 
because it prevents us from seeing who is participating in this conversation from the 
standpoints of socio-economic status, age, place of immigration, year of immigration, 
education, and other defining factors, in other ways, it is actually helpful.  Indeed, because of 
the anonymity the Internet provides, participants can self-identify as any number of ethnic or 
religious identities without fear of face-to-face discrimination, and are free to interact with 
groups they might avoid in real life; these are the conversations that will prove most 
revealing to this discussion.94  Third, those who comment on the Internet are a self-selecting 
38
 9195% of people ages 18-29 use the Internet in America while only 42% of people 65 and over use it.  
(“Demographics of internet users,” April 29-May 20, 2010, The Pew Research Center’s Internet and American 
Life Project, http://www.pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data/Whos-Online.aspx.)  In Russia, 
correspondingly, the age of the average Internet user is 30 years old.  (“Сколько нас, какими мы были, чего 
достигли?” День интернета 2010: ежегодный городской праздник, October 1, 2010, http://
www.ufacity.info/internet_day/2010/)
92Research in 2006 indicated that the prevailing profile of the visitors to Russian-language diasporic Internet 
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participants to express their true feelings. (See Nelly Elias, et al., “Spinning the Web of Identity: The Roles of 
the Internet in the Lives of Immigrant Adolescents,” New Media and Society 11, No. 4 (2009): 536.)
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group of individuals motivated to articulate something specific about this case and about the 
way they relate to the coverage of Vatolina’s poster.95  Although this use of Internet sources 
affects the range of opinions we encounter online, we have few alternatives; by looking at 
letters to the editor, we face the same problems while skewing the age demographic high and 
eliminating the potential for cross-generational comparison in these two communities.  By 
holding focus groups, we introduce the possibility of participants hiding their feelings in the 
face of an outsider.  All things considered, the Internet provides the best way to avoid these 
pitfalls, and demonstrates in an exciting, real-time, topical way how new technologies are 
being incorporated into the processes of performing diasporic identity, one that is particularly 
popular among Russian-speakers.96
 METHODOLOGY
 In my large-scale search for Russian-language responses to the English-language 
articles featuring Vatolina’s poster, I used the Russian search engine Yandex.ru and looked 
for the terms “не болтай” and “медикэр.”97  I chose these terms because I wanted to 
examine how the use of Vatolina’s poster in the scam framed the Russian-language responses 
the case elicited.  My search resulted in thirteen sources, but I eliminated two because they 
were summaries of the facts of the case on which no readers reacted.  Of the comments, 
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searches.  I chose Yandex, therefore, to conduct my search for Russian-language results, even though its results 
may provide more duplicates than a web scraper: Andy Atkins-Krüger, “Yandex Continues to Thrive in Russia,” 
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forum conversations, and online editorials that comprise these sources, participants respond 
either to Russian-language summaries of the facts of the case (the version most frequently 
used of these is by Sergei Merinov) or to online opinion/editorial pieces in Russian on the 
English-language media’s framing of the scam and its focus on Vatolina’s poster.98   There is 
no way of ascertaining whether all the Russian-speaking respondents whose opinions I 
analyze read the original articles in its English, and I can only speculate on how doing so 
might have affected their responses.99
 After collecting my Russian-language responses, I coded them, looking for terms 
and themes that indicated first, that the online conversations Vatolina’s poster sparked dealt 
with larger-scale identity formation and second, helped to identify specifically which facets 
of identity.  I completed my coding without the help of a language analysis bot because my 
data sample was of a manageable size. Because the websites I found that addressed Vatolina’s 
poster were all geared toward a Russian-speaking, diaspora audience, I looked for linguistic 
cues such as transliterated English words in the responses to indicate which international 
identities were being layered over or reconciled with a Soviet identity to create a new, hybrid 
persona.  I also looked for positive and negative references to the Soviet Union and to non- or 
ex-Soviet countries to gauge to which degree the English-language coverage of the poster 
spurned anger or nostalgia for the past.  Additionally, I searched for terms and references to 
gender differences, and religious and cultural references to determine the role these signifiers 
played in this online conversation about identity. 
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 Because studies of the Internet from a socio-anthropological, rather than computer 
science, perspective are still a relatively new phenomenon, scholarly findings suggest several 
different, and sometimes contradictory, methods of data collection and analysis.  Some, like 
sociologist Emily Ignacio, find that that the most appropriate model for examining a diaspora 
as it takes place on the Internet in various diasporic landscapes--chatrooms, new sites, social 
networking sites, etc.--includes a mixture of participant observation and conversation/
language analysis.100   Others, like women’s studies scholar Rose Marie Kadende-Kaiser, 
remind us that “simulations of actual interactions where a researcher actively seeks 
participant involvement in a planned experiment...fail [] to stimulate ‘natural’ communication 
in a virtual world.”101  She suggests instead that resisting interfering in the “interactive 
internet process, where the users are free to intervene whenever they feel the need to, without 
coercion by any outside force,” is the most appropriate approach for data collection, 
preferring instead to rely primarily on interactions that had already taken place for her data.  
This is because, “on some occasions, these [wireless] communities do not even form around 
a central person, place, corporeal organization or with the benefit of face-to-face interaction 
among members.”102
 Although each of these techniques has merit, I elected to rely heavily on the 
model recommended by scholars in Kadende’s camp.  I looked only at the comments I 
collected online without participating in the conversation or seeking to correspond with 
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respondents outside of the Internetscape.  I chose this method of research for several reasons, 
some logistical and some theoretical.  First, in this project, I am not interested in exploring 
how the online community I examine is an extension of a real-life diaspora community; in 
fact, because the Internet permits us to hear from participants all over the world, it would be 
nearly impossible to find a physical community that corresponds to the virtual group we 
encounter online.  Second, because scholarly research shows that unique qualities of the 
Internet (a sense of anonymity, the ability to connect with people all over the world, the 
freedom to explore new personaes) facilitate conversations about diasporic identity, I did not 
research the lives of the respondents outside the e-diaspora.  I focused less on the fact that 
they were extending their diaspora on the Internet and more on what their responses said and 
how the many freedoms of the Internet helped this conversation happen.  Third, I studied all 
the Russian-language, online responses to the scam I could find between July and November 
2010.  By the time my data collection began, the threads on the forums and the responses to 
the op-ed articles I encountered were already dead.  Although it would be an interesting 
extension of this project to restart these conversations several months after the fact, doing so 
would change my body of responses from one expressed organically to one facilitated by an 
outsider.
DIGITAL DIASPORAS
 Initially describing the larger Jewish community displaced from Israel, the term 
diaspora now refers to any ethnic or national group who has elected or been forced to 
abandon their homeland.  Diasporas communities around the world include Armenians, 
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Greeks, Chinese, Indians, Lebanese, Baltic Germans and, of course, former Soviet citizens 
both abroad and in the countries of the former Soviet Union.103  Primarily, experts in the field 
research and evaluate the unique qualities of various diaspora communities, particularly in 
relation to both the dominant cultural identity in their new homelands and their compatriots 
in their original homelands.104  They focus on ways that diaspora communities maintain ties 
with one another and with their homelands, while incorporating their immigrant identity into 
a new, hybrid persona.
 What is a relatively new area of exploration in diaspora studies, however, is the 
role that computer-mediated communication (CMC), including the Internet, plays in creating, 
articulating, or blurring the lines between diaspora communities abroad and their homelands.  
Digital diasporas, their formation, and their role in maintaining and changing a community’s 
identity appeared as a focal point of scholarly inquiry in fields as diverse as anthropology, 
sociology, media studies, and cybernetics in the mid-1990s.105  Predicated on the notion that 
“the resources that can be accessed via information technologies [such as the Internet] are 
critical to the development and nurturing of communities,” scholars have begun developing 
new ways to evaluate the importance of online chat rooms, forums, news sources, and expert-
specific websites in constituting virtual places to perform diasporic identity. 106  Following a 
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pioneering study by anthropologist Arjun Appadurai examining the importance of new forms 
of electronic media in creating a “more complicated, disjunct, hybrid sense of local 
subjectivity,” many diverse scholars have begun to look with interest at the unique 
phenomenon of the e-diaspora.107  Scholars explore these “ethnoscapes” as virtual spaces for 
members of cultural minority groups to cultivate “new ties...because of a common identity 
that is based on a former place of residence.”108 These online communities allow immigrants 
to “discover or sustain that commonality with those ‘back home’ and with others who have 
migrated,” meaning that, according to scholars, participants become “much more likely to 
continue to retain strong ties to their region of origin” than they were before the advent of 
digital diasporic communities.109  
 With an eye to these new innovations in the “doing” of diasporas, scholars from a 
variety of disciplines have begun to develop research techniques and methodologies for 
examining these virtual spaces with the goal of extracting the significant and evolving role 
CMC plays in diasporic identity formation.  Pioneering studies in this new virtual turn have 
looked explicitly at Russian/Soviet diasporas around the world for insight into how and why 
these identities are being articulated online.  This is in large part because of the extreme 
popularity of the RuNet (a term used to refer both to the .ru domain and to Russian-speaking 
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websites in general) among Russian-speakers around the world, and the proportionately very 
high use among Russian-speakers of social networking forums.110 
RESEARCH
 In my research, I performed linguistic analyses on ten disparate, Russian-language 
sources where participants discussed the Medicare fraud case and, specifically, the Brooklyn 
Bay Medical Care clinic’s use of Vatolina’s poster in their “kickback” room.  Each of these 
sources was geared toward a different, Russian-speaking audience.  I looked for fifty-four 
different criteria in these sources, including positive or negative references to Jews, positive 
or negative references to America/Americans, whether participants defended the scam’s 
participants, and whether they used possessive (“Наш,” “Наши,” “Свои”) or third-person 
(“Они,” ”халявщики,” “жулики,” “Совки,” “Мошенники”) to refer to them.111  
Additionally, I developed criteria for examining the online personae those commenting 
constructed for themselves.  These included categorizing the thumbnail photo accompanying 
their screen names according to gender or cultural cues, the screen names themselves for 
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110According to Henrike Schmidt and Katy Teubener, contributors to the interdisciplinary research project 
Russian-Cyberspace.org, RuNet initially rose to extreme heights of popularity because it provided an alternative 
to mainstream Russian culture.  Unlike content on television or radio, which is determined by normative 
guidelines, RuNet offers a “space for free articulation of non-normative cultural activities.”  In the post-Soviet 
space particularly, RuNet “may be interpreted as a symbol for both hopes and fears related to the overall 
atmosphere of change and transformation.” (Henrike Schmidt, et al., “‘Our RuNet’? Cultural Identity and Media 
Usage,” in Control + Shift: Public and Private Usages of the Russian Internet, ed. Henrike Schmidt et al. 
(Norderstedt, Germany: Books on Demand GmbH, 2006), 15, 20.); Statistics from May of 2010 indicated that 
12 million users of the RuNet have their own blogs, and that a given search on Yandex.ru yields 15 million sites 
with a .ru domain name. (“Сколько нас, какими мы были, чего достигли?” День интернета 2010: 
ежегодный городской праздник)
111Translated as “those who belong to our circle” the terms “Наш,” “Наши,” and “Свои” have a special 
connotation in Soviet understanding to mean those who fall between activists (whistle-blowers) and dissidents.  
They are not die-hard supporters of State ideology, nor interested in tearing it down.  (Yurchak, Everything Was 
Forever Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, 104.) “Они,” ”халявщики,” “жулики,” “Совки,” 
“Мошенники,” conversely, are words that denote those who do not belong in our circle, including free-loaders, 
cheats, criminals, and those who ascribe to an activist mentality.
nationality clues, users’ employment of idioms, use of non-Russian words, and the origin of 
the signature they included at the ends of their posts.  Because many commenters do not 
provide any explicit identifying information about themselves, these elective components 
that go into creating an online identity can give us clues into who is participating in this 
conversation, as well as to what degree they feel comfortable relinquishing their 
anonymity.112  Last, I looked for direct and indirect references to the poster in the comments 
and how participants in these conversations reacted to it.  This helped to solidify the 
characteristics of this group suggested by their other responses.
  DATA113
After coding my responses, I condensed my findings into the following trends:
Table 1: User Identity
Identity Frequency
Female 20
Male 13
Russian Screen Name 17
English Screen Name 56
Hybrid Screen Name 30
Russian Signature 13
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112As Dr. Donald Raleigh pointed out in a conversation with me, a desire to remain anonymous when discussing 
this case is particularly salient because of how it relates to Vatolina’s poster, whose message reminds those in 
the know not to identify themselves.
113My data analysis is, by nature, subjective. I worked, however, with Elena Maksimova, a native of Russia and 
a professor of Russian at Duke University as I coded my responses for outside, expert confirmation that I was 
interpreting them correctly. The categories represented here, of all of those for which I coded my sources, were 
the most salient to this conversation about identity production and reproduction.
Identity Frequency
English Signature 8
Russian Idioms 18
English Idioms 1
Table 2: Attitudes and Opinions
Referenced Terms Frequency
Soviet Union Positive 6
Soviet Union Negative 12
America Positive 15
America Negative 38
Jews Positive 7
Jews Negative 9
Russians Positive 3
Russians Negative 25
References to Soviet Culture 22
Concerns about mistaken impressions 
of Russians/Soviets in host country 36
Fraud-Justified 37
Fraud-Not Justified 47
ANALYSIS
 What I have found is that the Russian-speakers processing the advent of 
Vatolina’s poster’s redeployment as well as the American media’s focus on it largely self-
47
locate in a liminal state between their Soviet and assimilated-immigrant identities.114  
Although with regard to screen name origin, my results indicate that nearly three times the 
participants in this conversation selected one incorporating English, rather than Russian 
words  (56:17, 3.29), a substantial number elect to create a screen name that transliterates a 
Russian word into Latin letters (30).  This, paired with their use of Russian signatures and 
idioms, indicate that they are creating hybrid online identities.  Indeed, Russian signatures 
appeared 13 times, while English signatures appeared only 8 (.615), and 18 Russian idioms 
appear in the text compared with 1 American one (.005).115  Although my results should not 
be considered entirely conclusive, owing to the potential for commenters to elect to remain 
anonymous deliberately, the multiculturalism suggested by my findings is supported in the 
content of the comments I analyzed:
 Although an overwhelming number of responses (40) refer negatively to the host 
country (the United States) compared with 16 positive references (a ratio of .4), 13 comments 
refer negatively to the Soviet Union, while only 7 refer positively (a ratio of .53).  In spite of 
the fact that the aggregate total of comments referring to the United States is significantly 
higher than the total referring to the Soviet Union (56:20), the ratio of positive to negative 
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114Five of the sources are written explicitly for Russian-speakers in America 
(www.valera_kolpakov@livejournal.com, www.Vulfov.com, www.1977echg@livejournal.com, 
www.general_denikin@livejournal.com, www.russian-bazaar.com); one of the sources is written for Russian-
speakers in America and Russia (www.chayka.org); one of the sources is written for Russian-speakers in New 
York (www.arikagan.com); one of the sources is written for Russian-speakers everywhere in the world 
(www.forum.privet.com); and two of the sources are written for specific groups of Russian-speakers 
(www.baku.ru, a forum for people from the city of Baku all over the world, www.megapolis.org/forum, a forum 
for Russian-speaking Jews all over the world). Although we cannot assume that all commenters live in the 
United States, the majority of sources are written for Russian-speakers who live in America, and no languages 
besides English, Russian, and Hebrew (transliterated with Latin letters) are represent in the comments.  
115One of these was a quote for Anthony Burgess’ A Clockwork Orange.  The protagonist, Alex, uses a hybrid of 
Russian and English (Nadsat) to describe a girl he encounters.
comments about the Soviet Union is only slightly higher than the ratio of positive to negative 
comments about America.  
 This seems to indicate that members of the digital diaspora participating in this 
discussion are using the redeployment of Vatolina’s poster as an opportunity to parse out their 
identity relation to their Soviet pasts.  Indeed, like the poster’s Brooklyn audience, the online 
consumers of Vatolina’s poster approach the work with a new horizon of lived experience.  
As a result, the work is defamiliarized, underscoring the distance between the poster’s 
original context of deployment and its recontextualization in contemporary Brooklyn and in 
the American media.116  Accordingly, this new reading highlights incongruities between the 
mentalities, political atmosphere, and cultural attributes evoked by the poster and its 
redeployment, encouraging viewers to evaluate where they stand in relation to those Soviet 
conventions.  What they find through this comparison is that, although America may not be 
the perfect place for them, neither was the Soviet Union.117
 This response pattern is consistent with the changing nature of translocal identity 
brought about by new technologies, particularly the Internet.   According to scholars, 
 migration...used to be more “bipolar,” in that once people moved to another place, 
 they settled into their new home and began life anew.  With the assistance of new 
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116“Defamiliarization, or “ostronenie,” is a term coined by Russian Formalist critic Viktor Shklovsky to mean 
making familiar objects unfamiliar or difficult in order to “increase the…length of perception because the 
process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged.”  By decontextualizing Vatolina’s 
poster, Drivas, Wahl, and the American media effectively defamilarize it.  This process forces viewers to 
compare the first horizon of expectation with the horizon of lived experience. (Viktor Skhlovsky “Art as 
Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, ed. L.T. Lemon et al. (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1965), 12.)
117This exact sentiment is often reflected in other Soviet immigrant websites.  Many commenters in scholarly 
studies put forth the notion that, “despite the pain” of having been mistreated under Soviet power, “true 
Russians should not ignore their ethnic roots.” (Filipp Sapienza, “Communal Ethos on a Russian Émigré Web 
Site.” Paper presented at the International Conference for Cultural Attitudes Toward Communication and 
Technology, London, August 1998, 130.)
 technologies, newer groups tend to maintain multithreaded and simultaneous 
 footings in their cultures of origin and settlement.118  
In this new context, participants use their experience in the Soviet Union to understand and 
process their attitudes toward their host country.  They experience the “new culture through 
the prism of the old,” clarifying their attitudes toward the United States by relating them to 
their shared Soviet pasts.119  This process can explain the high incidence of negativity toward 
both the Soviet Union and America, as commenters find that both their pasts and presents 
lack fundamental criteria they require to be considered “home.”120  While members of the 
non-digital diaspora might attempt to recreate their former home with co-ethnics in the 
country of relocation, members of the digital diaspora are able to do so online; this provides 
them with a “reprieve from the stress of new surroundings, as well as a homeland context 
from which to interpret them,” while still promoting acculturation in the real world.121
 Another significant attitudinal trend manifested by the digital diaspora’s responses 
to this issue is that Jewishness does not seem to be a defining characteristic of this 
population’s identity.  This is evidenced by the overall low incidence of Jewish references in 
the coded material, as well as the fairly even ratio of positive to negative comments about 
Jews.  To me, this indicates two related characteristics of the post-Soviet identity being 
created and reinforced in this online conversation.  First, because there is not a substantial 
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118Filipp Sapienza, “Nurturing Translocal Communication: Russian Immigrants on the World Wide Web,” 
Technical Communication 48, No. 4 (November 2001): 435.  
119Ibid.
120This conclusion is supported by other studies, including Zeltser-Shorer, “Russian Diaspora On-Line:  
Community of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union on the WWW.”
121Sapienza, “Nurturing Translocal Communication: Russian Immigrants on the World Wide Web,” 435; 
Zeltser-Shorer, “Russian Diaspora On-Line:  Community of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union on the 
WWW.”
degree of anti-Semitism demonstrated in the comments, we can conclude that the participants 
in this conversation are, or want to appear to be, tolerant; indeed, at .77, the high ratio of 
positive to negative comments about Jews suggests that the Internet has helped facilitate an 
exchange of Soviet anti-Semitism in the form of Jewish scapegoating for greater open-
mindedness.122  This can be explained, in part, by the wide variety of nationalities, religions, 
and ethnic identities represented on the Web.  As a result, “Émigré communities used to 
maintaining cultural values in geographic seclusion must incorporate a wide range of cultural 
ideas into the discourse of communal identity on the web.”123  This suggests that the 
digitization of the Soviet diaspora has the effect of forcing participants to tolerate and respect 
the wide range of opinions and identity constructs presented on these websites, even when 
these do not correspond to an individual’s own beliefs.124  
 Second, as a side effect of the tolerance digital diasporas facilitate, Jewish identity 
may have become less of a defining characteristic for online participants of that cultural 
identity.  Indeed, although historically “Jews were kept distinct both by anti-Semitism or--for 
immigrants--by their cultural apartness,” in this online space where multiculturalism is the 
norm, Jewish participants are no longer defined by their outsider status.125  The result, as 
manifested in this virtual conversation, is the surprisingly low incidence of both anti-
Semitism and extreme Zionism.  This is especially significant owing to the fact that the 
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122Robery Byrm, “Anti-Semitism in Moscow: A Reexamination,” Slavic Review 53, No. 3 (Autumn 1994): 846.
123Sapienza, “Communal Ethos on a Russian Emigré Web Site,” 119.
124Kilic Kanat, “Ethnic Media and Politics: The Case of the Use of the Internet by Uyghyr Diaspora,” First 
Monday 10, No. 7 (July 2005)
125Zvi Y. Gitelman, et al., Jewish Life After the USSR (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 59.
scam’s participants were likely Jewish and that the nature of the scam itself coincides with 
Soviet stereotypes about Jews.126
  In spite of relative neutrality on the topic of Jewishness, many of the participants 
in these online conversations indicate an extreme dislike for Russians in their responses.  
Indeed, in my coding data I found three positive comments about Russians and 25 negative 
ones (.12).  I speculate that there are two explanations for this trend.  First, when commenters 
use the term Russian in this conversation, they are often describing Russian-speakers who 
have moved to the United States owing to the facts of the case; second, many of the 
generalizations they make about Russians are, in fact, incorrectly attributed to an inherent, 
cultural identity of this group.  These subtleties are manifested in the following comments:
 Я бы хотел обратить внимание властей что творят "русские" в Бостоне. Это 
 и получение ненужных лекарств тоннами "впрок" (через "русские" аптеки 
 которые не берут co-payment), и помощь на дому, которую многим не 
 предоставляют, а вместо нее предоставляют откаты, и фиктивные разводы 
 среди стариков (многим из которых за 80) чтобы получить еще одну 
 квартирку на шару. Список можно  продолжать.127
Here, the author places the word Russians (“русские”) in quotations in order to distinguish 
this population from the post-Soviet population with which he associates himself.  He 
expresses a disappointment in the behavior of “Russians” in Boston, singling out elderly 
people for behavior psychologists and health-care providers attribute to specific generation 
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126Soviet stereotypes about Jews in 1960 in the Soviet Union include: “Jews are business and money-minded; 
Jews are deceitful, dishonest, unprincipled, insolent, and impudent; and Jews are clannish and aid each other.” 
Also, as the Doctors’ Plot indicates, a fear of Jewish doctors dominated Soviet perceptions of this ethnic group. 
(William Korey, “The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An Analysis,” Slavic Review Vol. 31, 
No. 1 (March 1972): 112.)
127“I would like to bring the government’s attention to what “Russians” are doing in Boston.  It is both receiving 
unnecessary medicine by the ton “for future use” (through “Russian” pharmacies that don’t charge a co-
payment), and home care that many aren’t entitled to but instead receive kickbacks for, and fictitious divorces 
among old people (many of whom are over 80) in order to get yet another apartment for free.  The list goes on.” 
Арэн, July 17, 2010 (14:29), comment on “Как русскоязычные ‘уделали’  Medicare на $251 млн...,” Privet 
(forum), July 16, 2010, http://forum.privet.com/viewtopic.php?f=4&t=160376
and cultural characteristics.128  This commenter demonstrates how the term “Russian” serves 
as a floating signifier in the translocal space that is the post-Soviet Internet; in this virtual 
locus, additional identities (immigrant, Soviet-minded, unaccultured, criminal) are attributed 
to this nationality by members of that same diasporic origin as they attempt to distance 
themselves from those who are less assimilated.
 This comment demonstrates that Vatolina’s poster has obligated this virtual 
community of Russian-speakers to create a spectrum of desirable and undesirable qualities 
within their shared national identity.  A second comment illustrates a different way in which 
participants in this conversation parse out their relationships with their ethnic origins:
 Я на практике в Суздале в женском общежитии забыла маникюрные 
 ножницы в душе. Вернулась тут же - их уже не было. Девочки тамошние, с 
 которыми были хорошие отношения, ходили, спрашивали со мной - никто не 
 отдал.... И теперь, когда вспоминаю, не то, что жалко, а неприятно. Я бы их 
 сама отдала, если бы попросили, а так...129
In this instance, this Russian-speaking commenter indicates how a negative experience with 
dishonesty in Russia (Suzdal) informs her negative impression of Russians as a nationality.130  
She attributes an unpleasant event in her memory to the nationality of the person who 
perpetrated it against her, in spite of the fact that she shares the same heritage.  Theft occurs 
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128“There is no question about over-utilization of health care by Russians.  Health care is being tremendously 
overutilized”...”They are reportedly socialized from years of surviving communism to manipulate the system to 
access the maximum amount of possibly benefits.” (Karen Aroian, “Health and Social Service Utilization 
Among Elderly Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union,” Journal of Nursing Scholarship 33, No. 3 
(September 2001))
129“In the women’s dormitory at a practice in Suzdal I once forgot my manicuring scissors in the shower.  I went 
back right away, but they were already gone.  The girls there, with whom I had a good relationship, went around 
and asked after them with me- no one gave them back.  And now, when I think about that, it’s not that it’s sad, 
but rather unpleasant.  I would have given them back myself if I’d been asked, but as it was…” (Agrafena, July 
20, 2010 (16:59), comment on “Как русскоязычные ‘уделали’ Medicare на $251 млн...,” Privet (forum), July 
16, 2010, http://forum.privet.com/viewtopic.php?f=4&t=160376)
130This comments is part of a larger thread on the dishonesty of Russians.  
in dormitories the world over, but this commenter credits this particular instance with the 
Russian cultural context in which it took place.  She, like the previous commenter, attempts 
to draw distinctions of good and bad within the Russian-speaking community, and takes this 
opportunity to distance herself from the kind of Russian (Soviet, non-immigrant, uncultured, 
uneducated) that would steal someone else’s property on a national or personal level. 
 The high number of critical comments toward Russian-speakers demonstrates 
how online participants in this conversation are motivated by Vatolina’s poster to 
problematize post-Soviet identity issues.  They attempt, on a public forum, to position 
themselves in opposition to the negative reputation of former Soviets as organized criminals 
in a way that constitutes a post-Soviet doing of identity.131  Ironically, however, an equally 
high number of comments indicate that participants use their Soviet pasts in the form of 
cultural references and allusions to process their opinions about this issue (25 comments).  
This type of reaction indicates the degree to which Soviet identity continues to inform these 
commenters’ worldview, in spite of widespread interest in disassociating themselves from 
negative aspects of it.  Examples of these associations with Soviet identity include references 
to Soviet theatre, literature, and even explicit comparisons of differences between Soviet and 
American understandings of nationality.  This picking and choosing of elements of Soviet 
identity constitutes the simultaneous demonizing and idealization of the Soviet Union and its 
associations both at home and abroad frequently practiced by immigrants from former Soviet 
countries.132 
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131Scholarly texts go so far as to attribute Russian-language crime to an inability on the part of some immigrants 
to acculturate. (Larisa Fialkova and Maria Yelenevskaya, “Incipient Soviet Diaspora: Encounters in 
Cyberspace,” Nar. umjet 42, No. 1 (2005): 75.)
132Larisa Fialkova, et al., “Incipient Soviet Diaspora: Encounters in Cyberspace,” Nar. umjet 42, No. 1 (2005), 
86.
 Because Vatolina’s poster is both an artifact of Soviet culture and a tool used by 
demonized Russian-speakers to commit crime, it serves as a symbolic embodiment of both 
positive and negative aspects of Soviet identity.  As a result, it functions here as a structure in 
relation to which commenters can position themselves to parse their post-Soviet identities.  
Because Vatolina’s poster is the one element of this case that links Soviet identity, Russian 
identity, and immigrant identity, commenters’ characterizations of it flesh out the portrait of 
the digital diaspora being painted by their other responses.  Their understanding of its 
significance helps us to grasp better their situation between Soviet and ex-Soviet identities.
 The majority of commenters who address Vatolina’s poster express concern over 
the associative link between criminality and Russian-language identity facilitated by the 
poster’s popularity in the American press (4 comments).   They observe that, 
 Статьи проиллюстрированы советским плакатом "Не болтай!" Сразу 
 становится ясно, что речь идёт о русскоязычных мошенниках, которые 
 предлагают своим сообщникам держать язык за зубами.133
Because of the bold, visual association with Russian-speakers the poster provides, they worry 
that “раскрытое мошенничество ударит по репутации русскоязычной диаспоры в 
Соединённых Штатах.”134  The connection with criminality that the poster provides spurns 
this population to disassociate itself from the negative behavior of these “Russians.”135  
55
133“The article is illustrated by the Soviet poster, “Don’t Gossip!”  It immediately becomes clear that the 
conversation is about Russian-speaking swindlers, who are asking their accomplices to keep their lips 
sealed.” (Александр Сиротин, “Мошенничество с Медикером.”)
134”The uncovered scam strikes a blow to the reputation of the Russian-speaking diaspora in the United 
States.” (Евгений Новицкий, “Афера года глазами читателей,” Русский Вазар, No. 28, July 22-28, 2010, 
www.russian-bazaar.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=17479)
135This notion is supported by the fact that 47 comments indicated disapproval of the Medicare fraud scam and 
only 37 indicated that they believed the crime was justifiable.  Of the 37, the majority blamed the U.S. 
government for making Medicare crime so easy to commit, and the doctors for orchestrating the scam.
 Other commenters debate the intent for which Vatolina’s poster was redeployed in 
the kickback room in the first place.  Their responses indicate a wide range of reactions to the 
clinic’s use of the poster.  One even suggests that the poster was false evidence provided by 
the FBI.136  The author of a LiveJournal post about the case asserts that,  
 На суде в Бруклине, в качестве шутки был вывешен известный советский 
 плакат сталинской эпохи, где изображена девушка с приставленным к губам 
 указательным пальцем и надписью - "Не Болтай!"137
His understanding is that the poster was displayed purely as a joke without any deeper 
significance.   He is challenged by another participant in the conversation, however, who 
suggests Drivas and Wahl may have intended to do more with the work.  This poster writes,
 Не уверен что плакат в качестве шутки. Он якобы висел в комнате мед 
 офиса, где пациентам выдавали наличные за плодотворное сотрудничество. 
 Вот на суд его вытащили чтобы продемонстрировать злодейскость 
 мошенников честной публике. Публика исправно ужасается.”138
 These perspectives indicate that various participants in this conversation have 
different readings both of the motivation behind displaying the poster and also of the 
negative repercussions it will have on the reputation of Soviet immigrants.  This 
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136“Теперь по всем телеканалам показывают советский агитационный плакат с надписью «Не болтай», 
который оказался не в том месте, не в то время. Если бы на стене висел другой плакат, то и ему 
сотрудники ФБР придумали бы «правильную» трактовку.” [“Now on every television channel they’re 
showing a Soviet agitation poster with the caption ‘Don’t Gossip,” that didn’t appear in that place or at that 
time.  If a different poster had hung on the wall, workers for the FBI would have thought up a ‘correct’ 
interpretation.”] (Новицкий, “Афера года глазами читателей,” Русский базар, No. 28, July 22-28, 2010, 
www.russian-bazaar.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=17479)
137“At the trial in Brooklyn as a joke was hung a famous Stalin-era poster, where a girl is depicted with her 
index finger to her lips and the caption – “Don’t Gossip!” (general_denikin, “В США арестованы 94 человека 
за взяточничество.  Пациенты брали взятки у врачей (!!!!!!!),” С махновской рожей (blog), Живой 
Журнал, July 17, 2010, http://community/livejournal.com/rusam/2399711.html)
138“I’m not sure that the poster was meant as a joke.  Supposedly it hung in the room of the clinic where patients 
were given cash for effective cooperation.  They brought it to the trial to demonstrate the criminality of the 
scammers to the honest public.  The public, rightly, was horrified.” (bad_company, July 18, 2010 (4:04), 
comment on general_denikin, “В США арестованы 94 человека за взяточничество.  Пациенты брали 
взятки у врачей (!!!!!!!),” С махновской рожей (blog), July 17, 2010, http://community/livejournal.com/
rusam/2399711.html)
demonstrates the range of attitudes present toward the Soviet past and its authority 
represented in this segment of the digital diaspora.  For some responders, like the author of 
the original LiveJournal post above, the poster is only meant to be ironic.  Indeed, when 
confronted with the prospect that perhaps the poster was not intended as a joke, he replied, 
“Ну, я понял, что плакат висел в поликлинике. Но приволокли его в суд может и в 
шутку.”139  This commenter likely views the Soviet Union as ideologically defunct and its 
symbols available for decontextualization.  His reaction may also indicate a nostalgic 
appreciation for the ironic treatment of Soviet symbols practiced during the last several 
decades of the empire.
 His interlocutor’s reaction, however, speaks to something different.  To this 
viewer, the poster was redeployed in order to elicit fear in its Brooklyn audience.  His 
response shows his certainty that the poster was capable of evoking memories of Soviet 
punishments for betrayal even in a post-Soviet diaspora context.   His comments illustrate 
that he has an ongoing relationship with Soviet identity that allows him to relate to the 
poster’s original deployment in a serious way.
 What these responses suggest, when paired with other conversations surrounding 
the case, is the emergence of an inclusive identity on the Internet located somewhere between 
Soviet and non-Soviet.  Indeed, although respondents indicate a desire to distance themselves 
from some aspects of Soviet identity, they demonstrate, too, a reliance on their Soviet past to 
process their present.  Significantly, this liminality does not seem to cause these members of 
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139“Well, I understand that the poster was hung in the clinic.  But dragging it to the trial might have been a 
joke.” (general_denikin, July 18, 2010 (15:58), comment on general_denikin, “В США арестованы 94 
человека за взяточничество.  Пациенты брали взятки у врачей (!!!!!!!)” С махновской рожей (blog), July 
17, 2010, http://community/livejournal.com/rusam/2399711.html)
the digital diaspora anguish.  Indeed, while a high proportion of negative comments both 
about America and the former Soviet Union seem to indicate that majority of respondents are 
equally unhappy in both places, other qualities of their responses show something different:  
The desire to correct the negative impressions about Russian-speakers publicized by this case 
indicates to me that the participants in this conversation intend to remain in their host 
countries.  Their presence on Russian-language website directed toward members of the 
diaspora, conversely, demonstrates an interest in “articulat[ing] diverse and hybridized 
imaginations of home” with other coethnics.140  These reactions indicate a commitment to 
extracting what is best from both identities to forge a new sense of self.  This new identity 
will allow members of the digital diaspora not only to get by, but to thrive.  The result is a 
“quasi-diaspora that is no longer oriented towards the teleology of return” but rather, toward 
inventing a post-Soviet space where émigrés can “preserve those part of their homeland that 
they miss the most while being in full control of the frequency and intensity of their 
relationships with its virtual form.141  
 This theory is confirmed by language patterns manifested in all the sources: 
borrowing words from English and transliterating them into Russian, as well as creating 
hybrid Russian-English screen names, demonstrates a commitment to “acculturation and 
social inclusion” that indicates a desire for a hyphenated identity.142  This mixed language use 
also indicates how unique advantages in both Russian and English help to create a more rich 
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mode of expression for these users.  Through code-switching and borrowed words, this 
population fills in literal and conceptual holes in each language.  This shows that, while 
valuing their linguistic and cultural background, former Soviet “immigrants [online] 
nevertheless do not seek formal separation from the host society.”143  Instead, they hope to 
enhance their post-Soviet identity through language using cultural concepts borrowed from 
English.
 Like Sheila Fitzpatrick’s sympathetic description of Homo sovieticus, these 
members of the Soviet digital diaspora pull strings and mouth slogans simultaneously to find 
a mixed identity that will let them survive.144  Without abandoning entirely the Soviet past 
they need to process their post-Soviet present, they select those characteristics of their former 
identity they hope to preserve and distance themselves from those they do not.  The result is a 
hybrid identity that is at once nostalgic, critical, traditional, modern, Soviet, Russian, and 
functional in a multicultural setting.  
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
 In examining the relationship of two diasporic groups to the recontextualization of 
Nina Vatolina’s 1941 agit-prop poster in Brooklyn, my research demonstrates different ways 
in which these groups situate themselves between their Soviet past and their American 
present.  The first group, comprised of elderly Soviet immigrants living in Russian-speaking, 
Jewish communities in Brooklyn, manifests a disdainful but frightened relationship with 
official Soviet life.  Simultaneously, however, this population demonstrates a nostalgia for its 
Soviet religious and private life that inhibits its ability to acculturate into the dominant 
society.  The second group, made up of younger Russian-speakers living throughout the 
world but primarily in the United States, criticizes certain elements of Soviet life while 
relying on others to process its present.  This population’s reactions, speech patterns, and 
online identities demonstrate an attempt to retain perceived positive cultural characteristics of 
its past while rejecting those that inhibit integration into the host society.  
 I attribute these substantial differences to changes in generation, interaction with 
outsiders, and the development of new networking technologies.  Indeed, for members of the 
Brooklyn Bay Medical Care clinic’s patient body, language barriers, as well as learned 
cultural habits, confined this group largely to interactions with one another.145  The result is a 
145Studies indicate that “host language acquisition” is key in attaining “economic success and social integration 
in the host country. (Remennick, “Language Acquisition, Ethnicity, and Social Integration among Former Soviet 
Immigrants of the 1990s in Israel,” 431.)
community that mimics the “thriving sub-culture of ‘Little Odessa,’ populated by ethnic 
businesses accessible only to Russian-speakers.”146  Its inhabitants are characterized by “old 
age, relative poverty, and low rates of integration in the American mainstream.”147  That Nina 
Vatolina’s poster resonated with this audience in a criminal context both results from and 
evidences not only this group’s voluntary, intimate relationship with Soviet identity, but also 
their inability to evolve out of it.  Their lack of alternative identities prohibits these 
individuals from betraying the trust of their ethnic group.  These constraints give those with 
appropriated Soviet authority the power to victimize this diasporic cohort.  
 Members of the digital diaspora, on the other hand, manifest a different 
relationship with their Soviet pasts that is related both to their generation and to their 
interaction with a broad range of Russian-speakers. Younger Soviet immigrants developed 
more tenuous ties with Soviet mentalities and culture both because a shorter percentage of 
their lives were spent there and also owing to the ideological disaffection that characterized 
the pre-Perestroika period.148  As a result, they are less defined by their Soviet identities and 
more committed to finding a way in which these can be adapted to their lives in their host 
countries.  Additionally, this group’s use of modern technology, namely Internet forums and 
cultural websites geared toward the Soviet diaspora, increase the community of Russian-
speakers with whom they associate. Unlike the elderly Russian patients at the Bay Medical 
Care clinic, the online Soviet diaspora is forced to interact with unfamiliar attitudes, 
opinions, and memories of Soviet culture.  The result, as we can see from responses to 
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Vatolina’s poster, is a new collective unafraid of simultaneously loving and hating the Soviet 
Union.  
 While my innovative approach to this study of transnationality and the Soviet 
diaspora has been unconventional, it paints a vivid picture of two comparable models of post-
Soviet identity.  By relying on attitudes toward the reuse of a Soviet artifact in an entirely 
new context, I capture the relationship of two different groups of viewers with their pasts.  I 
attribute my success in this to the way Vatolina’s poster encourages readers to compare 
previous horizons of expectation with the horizons of their lived experiences.  Both groups 
underwent, either through compliance with Vatolina’s poster or discussions of its 
redeployment, an evaluation of their “own commitments and concerns: to better discover 
what they are, to reconfigure them, to place the ideas [they] have about [their] aims and 
identity in a different perspective.”  The results are public self-assessments of these 
populations’ relationships with their Soviet pasts and diasporic presents.  These constitute the 
compelling conversations about post-Soviet identity and its performance that I listen in on 
throughout this text.149  This trope provides significant advantages over others used to study 
translocal communities because it does not require these groups to articulate their 
relationships with their Soviet pasts to an outsider.  Instead, I rely on their actions and inside 
conversations for an accurate, unaffected picture of these two collectives.
 Although I believe this project has demonstrated in a compelling way how post-
Soviet identity can be at once stagnant and evolving, there are a number of different ways I 
could expand this project in the future.  First, I could tackle the idea that post-Soviet identity 
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expression changes depending on where and for whom it is performed.  I could accomplish 
this by comparing interviews with immigrants from the former Soviet Union about their post-
Soviet identity with conversations about identity formation undertaken online.  This project 
would broaden the scope of my current undertaking by reframing my study as an 
investigation of identity and alterity as articulated at the border of encounters with others.150
 Second, I could explore the extent to which the post-Soviet identity of the 
Russian-speaking immigrant community in Brooklyn is unique within ex-Soviet 
communities worldwide. I would accomplish this by comparing it with other similar, 
Russian-speaking cohorts in the United States (Brookline, MA., and Philadelphia., PA among 
others) and Israel on the basis of interviews and participant-observation.  This project would 
further refine the notion I present here that generation shapes post-Soviet identity creation, 
providing a more holistic impression of third- and fourth-wave, Soviet immigrants around the 
world today.
 Last, I am interested in testing the extent to which the autototality Soviet 
propaganda facilitated in its original deployment carries over into a post-Soviet, American 
deployment.  Would the Bay Medical Care clinic’s Brooklyn patient body react to Vatolina’s 
poster in the same way if they saw it for sale in a store?  In a school? In a home?  The 
association of Vatolina’s work with illegality, Soviet and American authority, and nostalgia 
for socialism’s stability in the context I investigate here clearly affects how it functions as a 
tool for defining and performing identity.  Would the result be the same in a different 
context?
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 In conclusion, I suggest that studies monitoring the development of post-Soviet 
identity contribute to our collective understanding of the global population’s changing face; 
this is important, as the development of a hybrid, post-Soviet identity predicts greater 
integration of Russian-speakers into various societies, promising more contact with 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union.   An awareness of the Soviet legacy among 
different diasporic populations gives those from different communities insight into behaviors, 
mindsets, and attitudes shaped by this past.  This in turn helps to facilitate productive 
interactions with Russian-speakers the world over.     
 I also assert that redeployed, Soviet kitsch is a compelling lens through which to 
examine post-Soviet identity construction.  This is owing both to its culturally-specific 
aesthetic style, as well as to the compelling visual vocabulary of which it makes use.  
Because kitsch has the power to elicit a nostalgic reaction in its viewers, it prompts them to 
evaluate their relationships with their past.  My study demonstrates how the shape and 
character of this relationship changes based on the context and community in which the 
kitsch is redeployed.  With these observations in mind, I suggest that particular scholarly 
attention be paid to the power of the visual to spark identity performance in the post-Soviet 
space, and hope this master’s thesis contributed to ongoing discourse on this subject.
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